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SUMMARYThe European Union’s budget review, launched last year, is an
opportunity critically to examine EU policies and instruments. Structural
Funds are at the heart of the EU cohesion effort, and absorb almost one third
of the EU’s budget. Their declared aims are economic growth and regional
convergence, but these goals do not always complement each other.
Allocation of Structural Funds is not efficient from a pure growth standpoint
and, although with enlargement cross-country transfers have increased sig-
nificantly, on average almost twice as much redistribution still occurs within
regions as opposed to between regions.
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European Union policies that aim to
foster economic growth and reduce
disparities have value. But these
objectives need to be targeted with
distinct and suitable instruments. The
separation of the growth and
redistribution functions of Structural
Funds is, therefore, desirable. In terms
of redistribution, Structural Funds
should aim at fostering cross-country
economic and social convergence,
leaving subnational allocations to
member states. In terms of growth,
investment should be primarily target-
ed at energy, trans-national networks
and research. Finally, the EU needs to
improve its capacity to assess the
performance of Structural Funds, and
EU policies more generally.
Fig 1: Redistribution through Structural
Funds, country average EU15
EU15 minus Denmark and Luxembourg.
Source: Bruegel, based on DG Regio, National Strategic Reference Programmes and Eurostat.
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IS STRUCTURAL SPENDING ON SOLID FOUNDATIONS?
IN 2005 the European Council
invited the Commission to ‘under-
take a full, wide-ranging review
covering all aspects of EU spend-
ing, including the common agricul-
tural policy, and of resources,
including the UK rebate’
1. The
Commission launched the review
with a consultation paper in
September 2007, and will deliver
conclusions by the end of 2008 or
spring 2009. 
This review is an opportunity to
rethink the EU’s policy priorities
and instruments. In this Policy
Brief, we focus on Structural Funds
(SF), the second largest compo-
nent of the EU budget. 
SF are the main instrument of the
EU’s cohesion policy. Their ration-
ale is 1) to encourage economic
growth; and 2) to accelerate the
process through which poor
regions converge with their richer
neighbours in terms of economic
and social development. 
We examine the performance of SF
relative to these goals
2. Results
show a disconnection between the
stated objectives and instruments
of EU structural policy, and indi-
cate that SF allocation is neither
efficient for maximising EU growth
nor an effective tool for
redistribution. There is no
evidence that the regions attract-
ing the bulk of SF are those where
the return on capital is highest.
Furthermore, on average, almost
three quarters of all SF received by
regions – setting aside transfers
across countries – are original SF
contributions from taxpayers in
those same regions.
Section one of this Policy Brief
introduces EU structural policy.
Sections two and three assess SF
in terms of their growth and
regional redistribution goals.
Finally, we discuss the policy
implications arising from the
analysis.
1. STRUCTURAL FUNDS:
OBJECTIVES AND INSTRUMENTS
“... the Community shall aim at
reducing disparities between the
levels of development of the
various regions and the
backwardness of the least
favoured regions”.
Treaty establishing the European
Community, Article 158
Although reducing welfare differ-
ences across regions has been
one of the EU's main objectives
since its foundation, there was at
the start little EU money to match
the goals. Structural spending rep-
resented just three percent of the
EU budget in 1970 and ten percent
in 1980. In 1986, the Single
European Act recognised regional
policy as an EU-level task, leading
to a significant increase in SF.
EU cohesion policy has two
financial arms: Structural Funds
(SF) and the Cohesion Fund (CF).
The former is allocated to regions
3,
while the latter is targeted towards
countrieslagging behind. We focus
exclusively on SF.
For the 2007-2013 financial
period, €278 billion has been allo-
cated to SF, representing 29 per-
cent of the total EU budget. During
2000-2006, SF accounted for
€233 billion or 31 percent of total
commitments. 
All EU regions, rich and poor,
receive structural funding. Each
region is categorised under one of
two 'objectives': 1) Convergence
(formerly Objective 1), which
accounts for 81.5 percent of total
SF and focuses on the least devel-
oped regions; and 2) Regional and
Competitiveness and Employment
(formerly Objectives 2 and 3),
which amounts to 16 percent of
total funds and targets regions
outside the Convergence Objective
to encourage innovation, entrepre-
neurship and environmental
protection, as well as to accommo-
date structural changes
4. 
Two instruments provide
resources to meet these
objectives
5:
• The European Regional
Development Fund (ERDF),
which supports infrastructure
development and productive
investment; and 
• The European Social Fund
(ESF), which facilitates the
integration of the unemployed
and disadvantaged into the
labour market. 
All regions, irrespective of their
Objective, are targeted by both
instruments. Since there is no one-
to-one correspondence between
Objectives and instruments,
growth and redistribution policies
are served by the same funding
instruments. We assess the per-
formance of SF successivelyalong
these two dimensions.
2. DO STRUCTURAL FUNDS
MAXIMISE EU GROWTH?
Existing evaluations of EU struc-
tural policy examine if SF promote
growth in beneficiary regions, but
do not assess if SF are distributed
1Financial Perspectives
2007-2013, Council of
the EU 15915/05,
19.12.05.
2To analyse regional
disparities, we focus on
income transfers.
Enough transfers
across regions are
needed in order to
foster convergence not
only in terms of
income, but economic
development more
generally. 
3Regions are defined at
the NUTS II level. NUTS
(Nomenclature of
Territorial Units for
Statistics) is used in
cohesion policy to sub-
divide national territo-
ries. NUTS II refers to
areas with a minimum
population of 800,000
inhabitants and a maxi-
mum of three million,
and largely follows
administrative struc-
tures in member states.
4There is a third objec-
tive, European
Territorial Cooperation,
which represents 2.5
percent of total SF and
comprises trans-
national programmes.
This is excluded from
the current study. 
5In 2000-2006, there
used to be three more
instruments: EAGGF
Guarantee (agricul-
ture), EAGGF Guidance
(agriculture) and the
FIFG (fisheries).IS STRUCTURAL SPENDING ON SOLID FOUNDATIONS?
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6Enderveen et al
(2006) and Cappelen
et al (2003) found SF
to be ineffective, except
for countries/regions
with an ‘appropriate’
institutional framework.
7The literature on this
topic has three main
limitations. First, the
effects on growth of
these policies may take
time. Second, it is diffi-
cult to make a causal
interpretation of
results, as SF are not
allocated randomly.
Third, SF-associated
opportunity costs are
not taken into account.
EU taxpayers finance
SF and the money could
be used elsewhere. The
relevant question from
a policy perspective is
if SF boost overall
growth above what it
would be in their
absence. See
Enderveen, et al
(2002) for a review of
this literature.
efficiently to start with. Since
resources are limited, more money
for one region necessarily means
less for others, so the key bench-
mark is to see if each euro is
invested where it will yield the
highest benefits for the EU as a
whole.
For transfers to be growth-max-
imising, they need to be allocated
to regions where capital is most
productive, ie where the marginal
product of capital (MPK) is high-
est. Do SF pass this efficiency
test? We estimate each region’s
MPK relative to the EU27 average,
and calculate their net gains from
SF (see box on page 8).
As Figure 2 shows, SF are not allo-
cated to regions with the highest
return on capital. This holds true
even when limited to non-
convergence regions. At best, the
relationship is flat; if not, it is
downward-sloping, meaning that
lower-MPK regions actually get
more money than those with high-
er MPK. The pursuit of conflicting
goals – growth and redistribution
– with one instrument creates
inefficiency. 
However,  while Structural Funds
may not maximise growth, they
may still contribute to it. Simple
correlations show that regional net
benefits per capita from SF are not
strongly related to growth, at least
when not conditional on any other
factors (Figure 3). This is consis-
tent with other results in the litera-
ture
6. However, overall, the
evidence on the impact of SF on
growth is mixed
7. 
The SF contribution to growth may
be curtailed by several factors. The
literature points to the displace-
ment of national regional aid, or to
regions’ strategic behaviour as
they implement projects that have
other objectives besides growth,
either to pursue rent-seeking activ-
ities or to retain their SF eligibility.
Similarly, the potential lack of
coherence with national policies is
also cited as a limitation.
But three other factors should be
highlighted. As this Policy Brief
shows, the redistributive role of SF
channels resources away from
economic centres – reducing
growth potential – instead of
focusing first on the efficient use
of funds. Furthermore, with the
EU’s eastern enlargement, regional
policy resources are spread thinly.
The population of regions where
GDP per capita is 75 percent or
less of the EU average increased
from 68 million to 116 million (or
from 18 to 25 percent of the EU27
population). In this new context, it
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Figure 2: Return on capital and Structural Funds net benefits per capita
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Figure 3: Regional GDP per capita growth rate by Structural Funds net
benefits per capitab
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makes more sense to concentrate
resources in lagging countries –
not regions – and to let domestic
redistribution take place at the
national level. Finally, as dis-
cussed in the following section,
the  nature of the redistribution
that takes place through SF also
limits the growth potential of
structural policies.
3. REDISTRIBUTION
Redistribution through structural
policies takes place on two levels:
1. Across countries, correspon-
ding to net country SF bal-
ances; and
2. Within countries, through: 
• ‘Inter-regional redistribution’,
related to the funds received
by a region from other
region(s) in the same mem-
ber state.
• ‘Intra-regional redistribution’,
equal to the SF received by a
region and financed by tax-
payers in that same region.
Whether SF redistribute financial
resources within or across
countries is important for the
rationale of EU structural policies.
If most of the redistribution takes
place internally within member
states, it is difficult to justify the
EU's active role. If, on the other
hand, redistribution were largely
across countries, then SF would be
carrying out the same task as the
Cohesion Fund, with the difference
that the former is channelled
through regions. 
International transfers
in structural policy
arise because some
countries are net con-
tributors while others
are net beneficiaries
(Figure 4). 
But net balances have changed
over time, mainly due to enlarge-
ment and to differences in eco-
nomic growth. Net positions of all
old member states worsened
between 2000-2006 and 2007-
2013, although Luxembourg,
Belgium and the Netherlands
remain the three main net per
capita SF contributors. Among net
beneficiaries, changes were espe-
cially significant for Spain (81 per-
cent fall in net receipts), while
Italy and Ireland became net con-
tributors. Today, the main recipi-
ents are the member states that
joined the EU in 2004 and after. 
On average, poorer regions receive
more SF per inhabitant net of their
contribution to the policy (Figure
5). This relationship is stronger
among convergence regions but,
on average, a regional per capita
income increase of
€100 is associated
with a decrease of €7
in net benefits per
capita. Regions in
Cohesion Fund
countries benefit more
from structural policies, even if
those regions have similar
incomes to regions in non-
Cohesion Fund countries. This is
also true for regions in countries
that have a more unequal per capi-
ta regional income distribution
8. 
Regions, like states, also have net
balances. The nature and extent of
the transfers that take place at
sub-national level are, however,
poorly understood. Using data for
2000-2006 and 2007-2013 and
thirteen member states
9, we
‘Pursuing conflicting
goals – growth and
redistribution –
creates inefficiency.’
Figure 4: Structural Funds average annual net benefits per capita
8These results are
obtained using
regression analysis.
9New member states
are not included in the
analysis since most of
their SF programmes
are national. Countries
with only one NUTS II
region – Denmark and
Luxembourg – are also
excluded.
Source: DG Budget. 2006 Allocation of Expenditure by Member State (2007), DG Regio and own calculationsIS STRUCTURAL SPENDING ON SOLID FOUNDATIONS?
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identify the extent to which
redistribution through structural
policy takes place across
countries, within regions and
between regions.
In 2000-2006, on average, 27 per-
cent of SF flows were inter-country
transfers. But, of the rest, three
quarters were intra-regional. With
enlargement, inter-country trans-
fers rise for 2007-2013, but intra-
regional redistribution is still twice
as large as redistribution between
regions in the same country (see
Figure 1 on the front page)
10. 
Results by member state are
shown in Figures 6 and 7. There
are some notable differences
between countries. For example, in
Italy, which practically breaks
even in structural policies and has
major inter-regional disparities,
inter-regional redistribution is
relatively greater although still
only 41 percent of SF flows in
2007-2013. For net beneficiaries,
most of the resources received are
transfers from other countries,
especially in Greece and Portugal.
But, for the majority of countries in
-3000
-1000
1000
3000
5000
7000
0 10000 20000 30000 40000 50000 60000 70000
IE FI PT SE AT NL IT UK DE BE
ES GR FR DK BG CZ EE CY LV
GDP per capita (2004), euros, PPP
N
e
t
 
b
e
n
e
f
i
t
s
 
p
e
r
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
 
(
2
0
0
7
-
2
0
1
3
)
,
 
e
u
r
o
s
,
 
P
P
P
Convergence threshold
Data refers to regions. Each new member state is considered as one region. 
Source: Bruegel, based DG Regio, National Strategic Reference Programmes and Eurostat.
Figure 5: Regional Structural Funds net benefits per capita by GDP per capita the sample, redistribution across
regions is limited.
Two examples may help interpret
the results. For Spain, a net benefi-
ciary of SF during the 2007-2013
period, 19 percent of SF received
originates from other EU countries.
Of the remaining 81 percent, two
thirds of the money spent in each
region comes from that same
region. The UK, meanwhile, is a net
contributor to SF. Of the SF
received by each UK region, 97
percent was simply contributions
from local taxpayers.
10Including co-
financing reduces the
redistributive effect of
the funds. Results are
available from the
author.
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Figure 6: Level of redistribution through Structural Funds, 2000-2006
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Source for Figs 6 and 7: Bruegel, based DG Regio, National Strategic Reference Programmes and Eurostat.
Figure 7: Level of redistribution through Structural Funds, 2007-2013IS STRUCTURAL SPENDING ON SOLID FOUNDATIONS?
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This exercise reveals two addition-
al points. Two regions with similar
per capita income, but located in
different countries, can benefit
very differently from SF. Take, for
example, Hainaut (Belgium) and
Galicia (Spain), both under the
Convergence Objective. Both have
a GDP per capita (PPP) of about
€17,400, but while
Hainaut is a net con-
tributor (€388 per
capita), Galicia is a
net beneficiary
(€949 per capita).
This difference
comes about
because, while SF
benefits depend on regional
income, contributions further
depend on how much the country
as a whole contributes to the EU
policy. If a region is very different
from the country's regional aver-
age, there can be a mismatch
between what it receives and what
it has to contribute to SF. 
Moreover, even for similar regions
in countries with comparable
income, there is a variation in the
net benefits they derive from SF.
For instance, Guadeloupe (France)
and Sicily (Italy) both have a GDP
per capita of approximately
€14,000, yet the former receives
– net per capita – 33 percent more
funds. An immediate implication of
this result relates to the logic
behind redistribution in SF. If the
goal is regional convergence,
would it be better to determine net
benefits (and not only benefits)
on a regional basis? How should
one account for non-income
factors that disadvantage one
region more than others? These
remain open questions. 
One subject discussed in section
two re-emerges here. If most of the
funds received by a region origi-
nate from that same region, it is
hard to imagine that they can have
large growth effects. Behind those
positive growth results is the unre-
alistic assumption that those
resources would have otherwise
been put to no productive use. To
really measure the
impact of SF, one
needs to show that
they generate bene-
fits above and
beyond what those
resources would
have accomplished
if there were no SF. 
The main lesson from this analysis
is that the inter-regional
redistribution that SF strive for
takes place only to a limited
extent. For net beneficiary
countries, a positive net balance
reflects redistribution from
regions in richer countries. For
most countries, SF largely redis-
tribute resources among individu-
als within regions. This finding
renders questionable the ability of
EU structural policy to achieve its
objectives of promoting growth
and reducing regional disparities. 
4. POLICY PROPOSALS
This Policy Brief has found that: 
• SF resources are not spent in a
way that optimises their poten-
tial to generate EU-wide growth;
and
• Regions themselves pay for
much of the SF they receive,
limiting the extent of inter-
regional redistribution. 
Results highlight the dynamic
nature of the EU. With enlarge-
ment, cross-country transfers have
on average increased significantly
to 40 percent of total flows of SF
and intra-regional redistribution
decreased. In a more diverse EU,
this is a step in the right direction.
Yet, almost three quarters of the
intra-country redistribution still
occurs within regions. 
The evidence we present points at
the need to rationalise structural
policy and echoes proposals put
forward in the Sapir Report
(2004). In the case of growth, we
provide further evidence of the
need to concentrate SF in those
areas with higher growth potential;
in the case of convergence, our
findings strengthen the case for
separating growth from
redistribution in cohesion policy
and rethinking the role of the EU in
subnational redistribution. 
Rationalise objectives
Over the years, there has been a
long debate about the appropriate
role of the EU across policy
domains, especially in
redistribution. On the one hand,
redistribution from richer to poorer
countries is often seen as an EU
public good since it fosters
convergence, creating major bene-
fits for the rest of Europe in the
form of new and wealthier markets
and steadier democracies. 
On the other hand, subnational
redistribution is a more divisive
issue. Subsidiarity, horizontal
equity across countries, transac-
tion and information costs and the
need for coherence with national
macroeconomic policy, all suggest
that national governments are
best positioned for this task – pro-
vided they do not violate competi-
tion rules. New member states are
‘Two regions with
similar income but in
different countries can
benefit very differently
from Structural Funds .’IS STRUCTURAL SPENDING ON SOLID FOUNDATIONS?
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a case in point. These countries
allocate most SF to thematic
programmes, ie infrastructure or
research, not regional ones. This
does not rule out the possibility of
countries decentralising project
implementation and evaluation. It
rather emphasises the need for
the EU to use country-level criteria
for the allocation of funds.
Find the right level
To promote growth efficiently, SF
should be allocated where the pro-
ductivity of capital is highest and
to projects with clear spillovers.
Currently, allocations appear inef-
ficient and trans-national
programmes – with major poten-
tial EU-wide growth externalities –
represent just 2.5 percent of total
funds. Re-orientation of structural
policies in line with the Lisbon
objectives, as in the last budgetary
negotiations, was a step in the
right direction. Lisbon policies
whose benefits are not limited to
the spending country – namely
transport and energy networks, as
well as research – have a clear EU
dimension and are good candi-
dates for boosting growth.
We have argued that the economic
rationale for EU involvement in
intra-country redistribution is
questionable. But the fact that
most domestic redistribution
actually takes place within regions
suggests that the instruments
used to tackle regional disparities
are not appropriate either. National
governments have their tax and
transfer systems for redistributing
income within their borders. EU
convergence policy would be more
effective if it focused on reducing
gaps between countries instead of
regions.
Improve matching of goals and
instruments
The current structure of SF recog-
nises that different regions have
different needs. But it fails to
translate this into an effective
one-to-one correspondence of
goals and instruments.
The ability of SF to gen-
erate growth is limited
by their parallel redis-
tributive role. 
This presents policy-
makers with a choice.
They can try to quantify trade-offs
and prioritise, which is difficult.
How much should the growth and
convergence objectives count
when assessing SF projects? Or
they can separate the growth and
redistribution objectives, and
design appropriate instruments
for each separately.
Two arguments are often put
forward in support of the current
system. The first is that the
process of managing SF empowers
regional governments. But decen-
tralised management of SF is com-
patible with the first-best where
within-country redistribution is a
member state task. The second
argument is that SF increase the
visibility of the EU. However,
Cohesion Funds, which allocate EU
funds to countries, also do this, as
does any project generating tangi-
ble benefits for EU citizens. Our
policy proposals, therefore, do not
undermine these benefits.
Finally, it should be stressed that
assessing the evidence of SF per-
formance is ham-
pered by the lack of
appropriate informa-
tion.  Ex-post alloca-
tion of SF is reported
by the Commission
only at country level,
making it difficult to
analyse the use of these funds on
the ground. Moreover, even where
data is available, there is no clear
institutional or conceptual frame-
work for evaluating EU policies.
Addressing these shortcomings
should be a main concern in the
future, as resources are sliced
thinner and thinner and new
spending priorities emerge.
‘Structural Funds
largely redistribute
resources among
individuals within
regions.’
REFERENCES:
Cappelen A., F. Castellacci, J. Fagerberg, B. Verspagen, 2003, ‘The impact of EU regional support on growth and
convergence in the European Union,’ Journal of Common Market Studies, 41, 4, 621-644.
Caselli, F. and J. Feyrer, 2007, ‘The marginal product of capital’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(2), 535-567.
Ederveen S., J. Gorter, R. de Mooij and R. Nahuis, 2002, ‘Funds and games: the economics of European cohesion policy’,
CPB working paper, 1-103.
Enderveen, S., H. de Groot and R. Nahuis, 2006, ‘Fertile soil for Structural Funds? A panel data analysis of the conditional
effectiveness of European cohesion policy’, KYLOS, Vol. 59, No. 1, 17-42.
Sapir, A., P. Aghion, G. Bertola, M. Hellwig, J. Pisani-Ferry, D. Rosati, J. Viñals and H. Wallace with M. Buti, M. Nava and P.
Smith, 2004, ‘An agenda for a growing Europe: the Sapir report’, Oxford University Press.IS STRUCTURAL SPENDING ON SOLID FOUNDATIONS?
b
r
u
e
g
e
l
p
o
l
i
c
y
b
r
i
e
f 08
Visit www.bruegel.orgfor information on Bruegel's activities and publications.
Bruegel - Rue de la Charité 33, B-1210 Brussels - phone (+32) 2 227 4210  info@bruegel.org
© Bruegel 2008. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted in the original
language without explicit permission provided that the source is acknowledged. The Bruegel Policy Brief Series is pub-
lished under the editorial responsibility of Jean Pisani-Ferry, Director. Opinions expressed in this publication are those of
the author(s) alone.
11We use other meth-
ods to calculate the
ratio of regional MPK to
that of the average
EU27. The one we
present here is the
most favourable for
poor regions as they
have relatively higher
estimates for MPK.
12We also estimate
regional contributions
using GDP per capita.
This is important for
regions where there is a
large difference
between residents’
income and the value of
production due, for
instance, to a large
number of commuters
(eg Brussels, inner
London). However, the
country results do not
change significantly.
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regional level is the same as that observed across
countries
11. 
Net Benefits Structural Funds
Net benefits, adjusted for differences in purchasing
power, are the difference between the SF received by a
region (‘benefits’) and that region’s input into the
financing of the policy (‘contribution’).  
Benefits
The regional allocation of SF is derived from cohesion
policy plans prepared by member states. Funds are dis-
tributed by region, except for multi-regional (such as
Objective 3 in 2000-2006) and national thematic
programmes. On average for 2000-2006, national
programmes with no regional breakdown represented
one tenth of total SF, while for 2007-2013, they are less
than one percent. In these latter cases, we allocate bene-
fits proportionally to population size within the relevant
group of regions. 
Our analysis uses programmed instead of actual regional
expenditure, as data on real spend is not readily available.
If poorer regions execute a smaller proportion of the
funds originally assigned to them, this Policy Brief over-
estimates the extent of inter-regional redistribution.
Contributions
We use each region’s share of its country’s disposable
income to distribute the budgetary cost of structural
policies
12. In turn, the contribution of each country to SF
depends on the share of the overall budget financed by
that member state. For example, in the case of France, on
average, it paid for 17.2 percent of the EU annual budget
in 2000-2006. As money is fungible, this means that it
also paid for 17.2 percent of SF policy. This contribution
is then divided among French regions proportionally to
their disposable income.
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BOX 1 Data and Methodology
Marginal Product of Capital
The MPK is the additional output resulting from the use of
one more unit of capital. Output (Y) depends on the
inputs used – capital (K) and labour (L) – and total fac-
tor productivity (A). Total factor productivity accounts for
other factors such as technology, education and the qual-
ity of economic institutions. We assume that the
production relationship takes the following form:
(1)
where      is the share of capital in output and 1– that of
labour.      is assumed to be 0.35, in line with existing esti-
mates.
Using 2004 data from Eurostat, we compute for each
region the ratio of its MPK to that of the average EU27.
According to its definition, the MPK (r) is: 
(2)
That is, keeping everything else constant, the MPK of a region
increases with total factor productivity but decreases with
capital per worker due to ‘diminishing returns’ (ie an addition-
al unit of input yields less and less additional output).
Total factor productivity is estimated from the production
function (1) as:
(3)
Based on country estimates (Caselli and Feyrer, 2007),
the capital per worker ratio is taken to be 1.1 times the
ratio of GDPs per capita. The assumption made is that the
relationship between K/L and income per capita at the